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ABSTRACT. The logic of $’.\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}$ maximizers’ $L^{um}$ is proposed which
is an extension of asystem of modal logic for two players. The sound
models according to $L^{um}$ are given in terms of game theory. It is
shown for the models that two utility maximizing players must take
the same action if they mutually believe that each takes adominant
action, even wben they have different informations. We remark that
the logic $L^{um}$ has the finite model property.
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the paper is to develop aformal theory of decision
making processes among two players under uncertainty based on modal
logics rather $\mathrm{t}_{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}$ on probability measures (as in the standard theory).
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reasoning about knowledge. There are pragmatic concerns about the
relationship between knowledge and actions, and there are also concerns
about the complexity of computing knowledge. Of most interest to us is
the emphasis on considering situation involving the knowledge of agroup
of players rather than that of asingle player although logicians tend to
focus on the process of reasoning about knowledge in the latter case.
We propose the formal theory of ‘utility maximizers’ that consists of
aformal system and aclass of models, in which each player takes the
actions being the best response to the other players’ actions. In the
system we use a‘logic of belief’ in stead of using the logics of $\mathrm{k}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}1\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}_{\Leftrightarrow}\sigma \mathrm{e}_{!}$.
and we show the two results in the models: First, each player chooses
an action when he simply believes that it is dominant, and second the
utility maximizing players must take the same action if they mutually
believe that each takes adominant action, even when they have different,
informations.
There are other kinds of theories of decision making. The theory of
‘agreeing to disagree’ is most interesting, in which all players must, make
the same prediction about an event ( $\mathrm{c}.\mathrm{f}$. Aumann [1], Bacharach [2]
and Matsuhisa [6].) It is noted that the latter one of the two results
mentioned above is avariation of the ‘agreeing to disagree’ theorem.
This paper organizes as follows: Section 2presents agame with be-
lief. In Section 3we propose asystem for ‘utility maximizers’ that is an
extension of asystem of modal logic. The sound models according to
the $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}_{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}$ are given in terms of the game theory with belief. Section 4
presents the logic of utility maximizers and shows the two theorems: the
completeness and the finite model property for the logic. The most im-
portant idea is that of acanonical model such as the sentences true in the
model are precisely the theorems of the logic. The idea of $\Gamma$-filtration
is also important in the argument for the finite model property. The
main problems in proving the two theorems become those of defining a
canonical model and its $\Gamma$-filtration. In Section 5we show that two util-
ity maximizers in each sound model must take the same actions if they
mutually believe that each takes adominant action, even when they have
different informations. Example (Prisoner Dilemma) demonstrates that,
they does not always take the same actions in case that each player sim-
ply believes that. he t.akes adominant, action. Section 6presents $\mathrm{t},\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ logic
for ‘agreement of dominant actions’ $L^{ada}$ and remarks $\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}$ the logic has
the finite model propert.y.
170
2. THE MODEL
Let $\Omega$ be anon-empty set called astate-space, $N$ aset of two players
{1, 9-}, and let $2^{\Omega}$ be the family of all subsets of $\Omega$ . Each member of $2^{\Omega}$
is called an event and each element of $\Omega$ called astate.
2.1. Information and Belief (Binmore [3]). An information stmcture
$(P_{i})_{i\in N}$ is aclass of mappings $P_{i}$ of $\Omega$ into $2^{\Omega}$ . Given our interpretation,
player $i$ for whom $P_{i}(\omega)\subseteq E$ believes, in the state $\omega$ , that some state
in the event $E$ has occurred. In this $\mathrm{c}.\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}$ we say that in the state $\omega$ the
player $i$ believes $E$ .
Player $i’ \mathrm{s}$ belief operator is an operator $B_{i}$ on $2^{\Omega}$ such that $B_{i}E$ is the
set of states in which $i$ believes that $E$ has occurred; that is,
$B_{i}E=\{\omega\in\Omega|P_{i}(\omega)\subseteqq E\}$ . (1)
We note that $i^{\backslash }\mathrm{s}$ belief operator satisfies the following properties: For
every $E,$ $F$ of $2^{\Omega}$ ,
$\mathrm{N}$ : $B_{i}\Omega=\Omega$ and $B_{i}\emptyset=\emptyset$ ;
$\mathrm{K}$ : $B_{i}(E\cap F)--B_{i}E\cap B_{i}F$ ;
The set $P_{i}(\omega)$ will be interpreted as the set of all the states of nature that
$i$ believes to be possible at $\omega$ , and $B_{i}E$ will be interpreted as the set of
states of nature for which $i$ believes $E$ to be possible. We will therefore
call $P_{i}i’ \mathrm{s}$ possibility operator on $\Omega$ and also will call $P_{i}(\omega)i’ \mathrm{s}$ possibility
set at $\omega$ . An event $E$ is said to be an $i’ \mathrm{s}$ trttism if $E\subseteqq B_{i}E$
We should note that the information structure $P_{i}$ is uniquely deter-
mined by the belief operator $B_{i}$ with $P_{i}( \omega)=\bigcap_{\omega\in B_{i}E}E$ .
99Game and Belief. By agame for two players we mean atriple
$\langle N, (A_{i})_{i=1,2_{i}}(V_{\dot{\tau}})_{i=1,2}\rangle$ with the following structure and interpretations:
$N$ is aof players {1, 2}, $A_{i}$ is afinite set of $i’ \mathrm{s}$ available actions (or $i’ \mathrm{s}$
pure strategies) and $V_{i}$ is an $i’ \mathrm{s}$ utility-function of $A_{1}\cross A_{2}$ into R. We
denote by $A_{-i}$ the set $A_{j}$ for $j\neq i$ .
An $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{f},\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}o_{\dot{\eta}}$ in $A_{j}$ is called dominant for $i$. if $V_{i}(\mathit{0}_{i}, a_{-i})\geq \mathrm{V}4(b, \mathit{0}_{-i},)$ for
all $b\in A_{i}$ and for all $\mathit{0}_{-i}\in A_{-i}$
Example 1. (Prisoners’ dilemma:) Let $A$ be aset of two available ac-
tions $\{o_{1_{\grave{J}}}o_{2}\}$ which is common for players 1,2. The utility functions
$(V_{1,}.V_{2})$ are given by Table 1.
In this example we can plainly observe that the action $a_{1}$ is dominant for





Definition. By agame with belief we mean atuple
$\mathcal{V}=\langle\Omega, (P_{*})_{*=1,2,E}, (A_{i})_{i=1,2}, (V_{i})_{i=1,2}\rangle$
with the following structures:
$\bullet$
$\Omega$ is astate-space;
$\bullet$ $P_{\dot{l}}$ : $\Omegaarrow 2^{\Omega}$ is $i’ \mathrm{s}$ information function for $i$. $=1,2$ ;
$\bullet$ $P_{E}$ : $\Omegaarrow 2^{\Omega}$ is defined by $P_{E}( \omega)\dot{\cdot}=\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\bigcup_{i=1},{}_{2}P_{i}(\omega)$ ;
$\bullet$ $A_{1}$. is aset of available actions for player $i$ ;
$\bullet$ V4: $A_{1}\cross A_{2}\cross\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}$ is $i’ \mathrm{s}$ utility function with the property
that $V_{i}(\mathit{0}_{i}., a_{-i};\omega)$ is injective on $A_{i}$ for each $a_{-i}\in A_{-i}$ and $\omega\in$
$\Omega$ .
Example 2. Atuple $\mathcal{V}=\langle\Omega, (P_{i})_{i=1,2}, (A_{i})_{i=1,2}, (V_{i})_{i=1,2}\rangle$ given as below
is agame with belief:
$\bullet\Omega=\{\omega_{1},\omega_{2}\}$
$\bullet$ $P_{i}$ : $\Omegaarrow 2^{\Omega}$ is given by $P_{1}(\omega_{1}):=\{\omega_{1}\},$ $P_{1}(\omega_{2}):=\{\omega_{2}\},$ $P_{2}(\omega_{1})$ :
$\{\omega_{2}\},$ and $P_{2}(\omega_{2}):=\{\omega_{1}\}$ ;
$\bullet A_{1}=A_{2}=\{a_{1}, a_{2}\}$ ;






Let. us consider asystem of $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{u}1\mathrm{f}_{l}\mathrm{i}$-modal logic as follows.
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3.1. Syntax. The lareguage of the system consists of the symbols, the
terms and the sentences as follows:
$\bullet$ Symbols:
Non-modal operators : $\mathrm{T},$ $\neg,$ $\prec,$ $\wedge,$ $\cdots$ ;
Modal operators : $\coprod_{1},$ $\coprod_{2},$ $\coprod_{E}$ ;
Variables: $\mathrm{a}_{1}^{1},$ $\mathrm{a}_{2}^{1},$ $\cdots’.\mathrm{a}_{n}^{1},$ $\cdots$ (Actions for players 1)
$\mathrm{a}_{1}^{2},$ $\mathrm{a}_{2}^{2},$
$\cdots,$
$\mathrm{a}_{n}^{2},$ $\cdots$ (Actions for players 2)
Predicates: (Equality on the actions)
$\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{1},$ $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{2}$ . (Dominant actions)
\bullet Tems and Sentences:
(i) The variables are tems;
(ii) If $\mathrm{s}$ and $\mathrm{t}$ are two terms then $\mathrm{s}=\mathrm{t}$ and $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{1}(\mathrm{s}),$ $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{2}(\mathrm{t})$
are atomic sentences:
The sentences of the language form the least set containing all
atomic sentences $\mathrm{P}_{m}(m=0,1,2, \ldots)$ closed under the following
operations:
-nullary operators for falsity 1and for tmth $\mathrm{T}$ ;
-unary and binary syntactic operations for negation $\neg,$ con-
ditionality $arrow \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ conjunction $\wedge$ , respectively:
-three unary operations for rnodality $\coprod_{1},$ $\coprod_{2_{j}}$ and $\square _{E}$ .
The intended interpretation of $\coprod_{i}\varphi$ is the sentence that ‘player $i$ be-
lieves asentence $\varphi_{i}$ ’and $\coprod_{E}\varphi$ is that ‘everybody believes $\varphi.$ ’The sentence
$\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{i}(\mathrm{a}_{k})$ is interpreted as $‘ \mathrm{a}_{k}$ is adominant action for $i$ .’
3.2. System of utility maximizers. By this we mean aset of sen-
tences, denoted by L,
$\bullet$ containing aset of all tautologies and closed under sttbstitution
and $m,odus$ ponens;
$\bullet$ has the following ,$\inf$. $eren,ce$ rules and axioms:
(N) $\coprod_{*}\mathrm{T}$ $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}*=1,2,$ $E$
$\varphirightarrow\psi$
$(\mathrm{R}\mathrm{E}_{\square })$ $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}*=1,2,$ $E$ ;
$\coprod_{*}\varphi-\square *’\psi$
$(\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\coprod_{E})$ $\square _{E\varphi}-\coprod_{1\varphi\wedge\coprod_{2}\varphi;}$
$(\mathrm{R}\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}1})$ $\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i}=\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i}\wedge \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{i}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i})arrow \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{i}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i})$ for $\dot{\tau.}=1,$ 2.
$(\mathrm{R}\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}1})$ $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{j}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i})\wedge \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{i}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i})arrow \mathrm{a}_{k}^{i}=\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i}$ for i. $=1_{i}2$ .
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Let S be the set of all sentences in asystem L, $\Gamma$ asubset of S and
let $\varphi$ be asentence. Then $\varphi$ is $L$-deducible, $\Gamma\vdash_{L}\varphi$ , if there exists
$\chi_{1},$ $\chi_{2},$ $\cdots\chi_{m}\in\Gamma$ such that the sentence of form $\chi_{1}\wedge\chi_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge\chi_{m}arrow\varphi$
is in $\Gamma$ . $\varphi$ is an L–theorem(or simply atheorem), $\vdash_{L}\varphi$ , if $\varphi\in L$ .
3.3. Semantics. Amodel $\mathcal{M}$ for asystem L is atuple $\langle \mathcal{V}, v_{\mathcal{M}}, \pi_{v_{\mathcal{M}}}\rangle$ with
the following structures:
$\bullet$ $\mathcal{V}=\langle\Omega_{j}(P_{*})_{*=1,2,E}, (A_{i})_{i=1,2}, (V_{i})_{i=1,2}\rangle$ is agame with belief such
that
(i) $A_{i}:=\{a_{1}^{i},\mathit{0}_{12}^{i}, \cdots, a_{n}^{i}, \cdots\}$ for $i=1\dot,$ $2$ ;
(ii) $V_{i}(\mathit{0}_{ij}.a_{-i};\omega)$ is injective on $A_{i}$ for each $\mathit{0}_{-i}.\in A_{-i}$ and $\omega\in$
$\Omega$ .
$\bullet$ $v_{\mathcal{M}}^{i}$ : $\{\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i}|k=1,2, \cdots,n, \cdots\}arrow A_{i}$ is amapping of $i’ \mathrm{s}$ variables
into $i’ \mathrm{s}$ available actions;
$\bullet$
$v_{\mathcal{M}}$ : $\bigcup_{i=1,2}\{\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i}|\mathrm{A}=1,2, \cdots, n\}arrow\bigcup_{i=1,2}A_{i}$ is the valuation of
variables into available actions defined by
$v_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{\dot{l}};\omega):=v_{\mathcal{M}}^{i}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i};\omega)$ ;
$\bullet$
$\pi_{v_{\mathcal{M}}}$ : $\{\mathrm{P}_{m}|m=0,1,2, \ldots\}\cross\Omegaarrow$ { $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ , false} is atruth
assignment such that, for all $\omega\in\Omega$ ,
(i) $\pi_{v.\kappa\tau}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i}=\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i},\omega)=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ if and only if $v_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathrm{a}_{k1}^{i}.\omega)=$
$v_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i};\omega)$ ;
(ii) (a) $\pi(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{1}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{1}),\omega)=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ if and only if
$V_{1}(v_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{1}), c;\omega)\geq V_{1}(b, c;\omega)$ for all $b\in A_{1},$ $c\in A_{2}$ ;
(b) $\pi$ ( $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{2}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2})$ ,ci) $=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ if and only if
$V_{2}(a,v_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2});\omega)\geq V_{2}(a,$b; $\omega)$ for all a $\in A_{1},$ b $\in A_{2}$ .
.3.4. Validity. Truth $\models_{\mathrm{t}D}^{\mathcal{M}}\varphi$ at $\omega$ in $\mathcal{M}$ is inductively defined as follows:
(i) $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\mathrm{P}_{m}$ if and only if $\pi(\mathrm{P}_{m},\omega)=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$
for each atomic sentence $\mathrm{P}_{m}$ ;
(ii) $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\mathrm{T}$ ;
(iii) $\models_{\acute{\omega}}|\varphiarrow\psi$ if and only if $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\varphi \mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}1\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\psi$ ;
(iv) $\models_{\acute{\omega}}\vee 1\square _{i}\varphi$ if and only if $P_{i}(\omega)\subseteq\{\xi\in\Omega|\models_{\xi}^{\mathcal{M}}\varphi\}$ , for
$i,$ $=1.2;$
’
(v) $\models_{\mathrm{t}d}^{\mathcal{M}}\square _{E}\varphi$ if and only if $P_{E}( \omega)\dot{\cdot}=\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\bigcup_{\dot{\tau}=1},{}_{2}P_{i}(\omega)\subseteq||\varphi||^{\mathcal{M}}$ ,
where $||\varphi||^{\mathcal{M}}$ denotes $\{\xi\in\Omega|\models_{\xi}^{\mathcal{M}}\varphi\}$ . We say $\mathrm{t},\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}_{1}\varphi$ is valid in $\mathcal{M}$ and
write $\models^{\vee \mathrm{t}}J\varphi$ if $\varphi$ is true for every $\omega\in\Omega$ .
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4. LOGIC OF UTILITY MAXIMIZERS
4.1. We concern with proving that asystem of utility maximizers is
determined by the class of models.
Definition. The logic of utility rruwirnizers is the smallest system of
utility maximizers, denoted by $L^{um}$ , and $\mathrm{M}_{L^{um}}$ denotes the class of all
models for $L^{um}$ .
4.2. Let Ibe asubset of the set of all sentences $S$ in asystem $L$ . We
say that $\mathcal{M}$ is amodel for Iif every member of Iis true in M. Let $\mathrm{C}$
be aclass of models. We denote $\models_{\mathrm{C}}\varphi$ to mean that $\varphi$ is valid in every
model of C. Asystem of utility maximizers $L$ is sound with respect. to $\mathrm{C}$
if every member of $\mathrm{C}$ is amodel for $L$ . It is complete with respect to $\mathrm{C}$ if
every sentence valid in all members of $\mathrm{C}$ is atheorem of $L$ . We say that
$L$ is detervnined by $\mathrm{C}$ if $L$ is sound and complete with respect to C. We
say amodel for $L$ to be finite if its state-space is afinite set.
4.3. Soundness and Completeness for $L^{um}$ . The following theorems
are our main results:
Theorem 1. The logic of utility maximizers is sound with respect to the
class $\mathrm{M}_{L^{um}}$ of all models.
Proof. immediately follows from the definition of the model. $\square$
Theorem 2. The logic of utility maximizers is complete with respect to
th.e class $\mathrm{M}_{L^{um}}$ of all models.
Theorem 3. Th.e logic of utility maximizers $h\alpha s$ the finite rnodel prop-
erty.
The proofs of the theorems will be found in the later section (4.9).
4.4. Lindenbaum’s lemma. Let $\Gamma$ be aset of sentences in asystem
$L$ and $\varphi$ asentence. Aset $\Gamma$ is $L$-consistent if there exists at least one
sentence not, &deducible from $\Gamma$ , and $L$-inconsistent otherwise. Aset $\Gamma$
is $L$-maximal, $\mathrm{b}.\mathrm{I}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}_{L}\Gamma$ if $\Gamma$ is $L$-consistent and for each sentence $\varphi$ either
$\varphi\in\Gamma$ or $\neg\varphi\in\Gamma$ . We denote by $\Omega_{L}$ the class of Amaximally consistent
$\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}_{1}\mathrm{s}$ . For asentence $\varphi,$ $|\varphi|_{L}:=\{{\rm Max}_{L}\Gamma\in\Omega_{L}|\varphi\in{\rm Max}_{L}\Gamma\}$ . For aset
$\Lambda$ of sentences., $|\Lambda|_{L}:=\{{\rm Max}_{L}\Gamma\in\Omega_{L}|\Lambda\subseteq{\rm Max}_{L}\Gamma\}$ .
To prove the theorem we need the following result, which proof can be
found in [4].
Lemma 1. Let $L$ be a $s\tau/stem$, of utility $max\dot{\mathrm{v}}mizers$ .
(i) $Ever\tau/L$ -coo.sistert.tset of sentences h,as an $L- m\alpha ximal$ extensionj
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(ii) $\Gamma\vdash_{L}\varphi$ if and only $if|\Gamma|_{L}\subseteq|\varphi|_{L}$ .
We record the immediate consequences of the lemma as follows:
Remark. (i) Asentence in $L$ is deducible from aset of sentences $\Gamma$
if and only if it belongs to every kmaximally consistent set of
$\Gamma$ ;
(ii) Asentence is atheorem of $L$ if and only if it is amember of
every kmaximally consistent set of sentences.
(iii) Asentence of form $\varphiarrow\psi$ is atheorem of $L$ if and only if
$|\varphi|_{L}\subseteqq|\psi|_{L}$ .
4.5. Canonical Model. Let $L$ be asystem of utility maximizers. The
canonical model $\mathcal{M}_{L}$ for $L$ is the tuple $\langle \mathcal{V}_{L},v_{L}, \pi_{v_{L}}\rangle$ for $L$ with the game
with belief $\mathcal{V}_{L}=\langle\Omega_{L}, (P_{\dot{l}}^{L}):=1,2, (A_{i}^{L})_{i=1,2}, (V_{1}^{L}.):=1,2\rangle$ , which consists of:
\bullet $\Omega_{L}$ is the set of all the Amaximally consistent sets of sentences;
$\bullet$ $P_{*}^{L}(\omega):=\{\xi\in\Omega_{L}|\square _{*}\varphi\in\omega\Rightarrow\varphi\in\xi\}$ for $\omega\in\Omega_{L}$ and
$*=1,2,$ $E$ .




for every $\omega\in\Omega_{L}$ .





$v_{L}$ : $\bigcup_{i=1.2}\{\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i}|\mathrm{A}=1,2, \cdots, n, \cdots\}\cross\Omega_{L}arrow\bigcup_{i=1,2}A_{i}$ is defined
by the same way as above.
$\bullet$
$\pi_{L}$ : $\{\mathrm{P}_{m}|m=0.1,2"\ldots\}\cross\Omega_{L}arrow$ { $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ , false} is the truth
assignment such that
(i) $\pi_{L}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i}=\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i}, \omega)=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ if and only if $\mathrm{c}\prime_{L}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i};\omega)=v_{L}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i}: \omega)$ ;
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(ii) (a) $\pi_{L}(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{1}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{1}),\omega)=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ if and only if
$V_{1}^{L}(v_{L}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{1}), b;\omega)\geq V_{1}^{L}(a, b;\omega)$ for all $a\in A_{1},$ $b\in A_{2}$ ;
(b) $\pi_{L}(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{2}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2}), \omega)=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ if and only if
$V_{2}^{L}(a,v_{L}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2});\omega)\geq V_{2}^{L}(a,b;\omega)$ for all $a\in A_{1\}}b\in A_{2}$ .
Proposition 1. The canonical model is actually a model for a system of
utility maximizers.
Proof. immediately follows from the definition of the canonical model.
$\square$
4.6. The important result about the canonical model is the following:
Basic theorem. Let $\mathcal{M}_{L}$ be the canonical model for a systern L of utility
rnairnizers. Then for every sentence $\varphi$ ,
$\models^{\mathcal{M}_{L}}\varphi$ if and on.ly if $\vdash_{L}\varphi$ .
In other words,
$||\varphi||^{\mathcal{M}_{L}}=|\varphi|_{\mathcal{M}_{L}}$ .
Proof. By induction on the complexity of $\varphi$ . We treat only the case
$\varphi=\coprod_{*}\psi$ . As an inductive hypothesis we assume that $||\psi||^{\mathcal{M}_{L}}=|\psi|_{\mathcal{M}_{L}}$ .
Then for every $\omega\in\Omega_{L)}$
$\models_{\acute{\omega}}\vee \mathrm{t}_{L\coprod_{*}\psi}$ if and only if $P_{*}^{L}(\omega)\subseteq||\psi||_{i}^{\mathcal{M}_{L}}$
by the definition of canonical model ;
if and only if $P_{*}^{L}(\omega)\subseteq|\psi|_{L}$ ,
by the inductive hypothesis as above;
if and only if $\vdash_{L}\psi$ .
$\square$
4.7. Filtration. Let, $\Gamma$ be aset of sentences
$\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t},\mathrm{h}$ the following properties:
$(\gamma_{1})\Gamma$ is closed under subsentences:
$(\gamma_{2})\mathrm{B}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t},\mathrm{h}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{i}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i})$ and $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{i}(\mathrm{a}_{1}^{i})$ belong in $\Gamma$ whenever $\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i}=\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i}$ .
We define t.he equivalence relation $\equiv_{\Gamma}$ on $\Omega_{L}$ by
$\omega\equiv_{\Gamma}\xi$ if and only if for every sentence $\psi$ of $\Gamma$ ,
$\models_{\acute{\omega}}^{\mathrm{v}_{L\prime}}\psi$ $\Leftrightarrow$ $\models_{\xi}^{\mathcal{M}_{L}}\psi$ .
We denote by $[\omega]\mathrm{t}_{\uparrow}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ equivalence class of $\omega$ and denot.e by $[X]$ the set of
equivalence classes $[_{\acute{\iota}}v]$ for all $\omega$ of $X$ whenever $X$ is asubset of
$\Omega_{L}$ .
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Definition. By the $\Gamma$-filtration $\mathcal{M}_{L}^{\Gamma}$ (or the filtration of $\mathcal{M}_{L}$ through $\Gamma$),
we mean astructure for $L$
$\langle\Omega_{L}^{\Gamma}, (P_{*}^{L,\Gamma})_{*=1,2,E}, (A_{i}^{L,\Gamma})_{i=1,2}, (V_{1}^{L,\Gamma}.)_{i=1,2},v_{L}^{\Gamma}, \pi_{v_{L}}^{\Gamma}\rangle$
consists of the following structures: For each $*=1,2,$ $E$ ,
$\bullet$ $\Omega^{\Gamma}=[\Omega_{L}]$ ;
$\bullet$ For every $\omega,\cdot\xi$ in $\Omega$ ,
(i) if $\langle$ $\in P_{*}^{L}(\omega)$ , then $[\xi]\in P_{*}^{L,\Gamma}([\omega])$ ;
(ii) if $[\xi]\in P_{*}^{L,\Gamma}([\omega])$ , then for every sentence $\varphi\in\Gamma$ ,
$\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}_{L}}\square _{*}\varphi$ implies $\models_{\xi}^{\mathcal{M}_{L}}\varphi$
$\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}*=1,2,$ $E$ .
$\bullet$ $A_{i}^{L,\Gamma}=A_{i}^{L}$ , and $V_{i}^{L,\Gamma}(a_{1}, a_{2,}.\cdot.[\omega]):=V_{i}^{L}(a_{1},\mathit{0}_{2},;\omega)$ for $i=1,2_{\dot{l}}$.




$v_{L}^{\Gamma}$ : $\bigcup_{i=1,2}\{\mathrm{a}_{k}^{\dot{l}}|k=1,2, \cdots, n, \cdots\}\cross\Omega_{L}^{\Gamma}arrow\bigcup_{i=1,2}$ Ais defined
by the same way in Subsection (3.3);
$\bullet$ the truth assignment $\pi_{L}^{\Gamma}$ : $\{\mathrm{P}_{m}|m=0,1,2, \ldots\}\cross\Omega_{L}^{\Gamma}arrow$
{true, false} is defined by the same way in Subsection(3).]
Remark. We note that $v_{L}^{\Gamma i}(\cdot;[\omega])$ and $\pi_{L}^{\Gamma}(\cdot;[\omega])$ are independent of the
choices of representatives in the $\Gamma$-equivalence of each $\omega$ , because of
$(\mathrm{R}\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}}),$ $(\mathrm{R}\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}})$ and the definition of $\Gamma$-equivalence.
Proposition 2. The canonical model $\mathcal{M}_{L}^{\Gamma}$ is actually a member of th.e
class of the models $\mathrm{M}_{L}$ for a systern of utility maximizers $L$ with th.e
property that
$\pi_{L}^{\Gamma}(\mathrm{P}_{m};[\omega])=\pi_{L}(\mathrm{P}_{m};\omega)$
for each $\mathrm{P}_{m}\in\Gamma$ .
$1_{\pi_{L}^{\Gamma}}$ : $\{\mathrm{P}_{m}|m=0,1,2, \ldots\}\cross\Omega_{L}arrow$ { $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ , false} is tlie assignment such that
(i) $\pi_{L}^{\Gamma}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i}=\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i}. [\omega])=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ if and only if $v_{L}^{\Gamma}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i};[\omega])=\tau_{L}^{\Gamma}’(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i}; [\omega])$ ;
(ii) (a) $\pi_{L}^{\Gamma}(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{1}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{1}), [\omega])=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ if and only if
$V_{1}^{L,\Gamma}(v_{L}^{\Gamma}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{1}), b;[\omega])\geq V_{1}^{L,\Gamma^{\backslash }}(a, b;[\omega])$ for all $a\in A_{1},$ $b\in A_{2}$ ;
(b) $\pi_{L}^{1^{\backslash }}(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{2}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2}), [\omega])=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ if and only if
$V_{2}^{L,\Gamma}(a,v_{L}^{\Gamma}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2});[\omega])\geq V_{2}^{L,\mathrm{r}^{\neg}}(a, b;[\omega])$ for all $a\in A_{1},$ $b\in A_{2}$ .
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4.8. By induction on the complexity of asentence $\varphi$ we can verify that
Proposition 3. Let $\mathcal{M}_{L}$ be the canonical model for a systern $L$ and $\mathcal{M}_{L}^{\Gamma}$
a $\Gamma$ -filtration. Then the following two properties are true:
(i) For every sentence $\varphi$ in $\Gamma$ ,
$\models^{\mathcal{M}_{L}}\varphi$ if and only if $\models^{\mathcal{M}_{L^{\Gamma}}}\varphi$ .
(ii) The model $\mathcal{M}_{L}^{\Gamma}$ is finite if so is $\Gamma$ .
$\square$
4.9. Proof of Theorems 2and 3. Let us consider the case L $=L^{um}$ .
It is noted that the canonical model $\mathcal{M}_{L^{um}}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{e}1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}_{\Leftrightarrow}\sigma \mathrm{s}$ to the class $\mathrm{M}_{L^{um}}$ .
4.9.1. Proof of Theorem 2. If asentence $\varphi$ is valid in $\mathrm{M}_{L^{u}}$-then $\varphi$ is
true in $\mathcal{M}_{L^{um_{j}}}$ and hence $\varphi$ is atheorem in $L^{um}$ by the basic theorem in
Section (4.6).
4.9.2. Proof of Theorem 3. Let $\mathrm{M}_{L^{um},FIN}$ denote the subclass of all finite
models in $\mathrm{M}_{L^{um}}$ . If $\vdash_{L}\varphi$ then $\models_{\mathrm{M}_{L^{um}}}\varphi$ , and so $\models_{\mathrm{M}_{L^{um}FIN}}\varphi$ since
$\mathrm{M}_{L^{um}FIN}\subseteq \mathrm{M}_{L}$ . The converse will be shown by contrapositive argument
as follows: Suppose that not $\vdash_{L}\varphi$ , so that not $\models^{\mathcal{M}_{L^{um}}}\varphi$ by the basic
theorem in in Section (4.6). Let $\Gamma$ be the least set of subsentences of
$\varphi$ such that $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\iota.(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i})$ and $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{i}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{i})\in\Gamma$ whenever $\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i}=\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{t}}^{i}\in\Gamma$ . By
Proposition 3we conclude that not $\models^{\mathcal{M}_{L^{um}}^{\Gamma}}\varphi$ and $\mathcal{M}_{L^{um}}^{\Gamma}\in \mathrm{M}_{L^{um}FIN}$ on
noting that $\Gamma$ is afinite set, so the contradiction follows. $[]$
5. AGREEMENT THEOREM OF DOMINANT ACTIONS
\={o}. 1. Let $L$ be asystem of utility maximizers. Amodel $\mathcal{M}=\langle..)(V_{i})_{i=1,2}, ..\rangle$
in $\mathrm{M}_{L}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ called symrnetric if $A_{1}=4_{2}A$ and $V_{1}(\mathit{0},, b;\omega)=V_{2}$ ( $b,$ $a$ ;ci) for all
$a,$ $b\in A=A_{1}=A_{2}$ .
We denote by $\mathrm{M}_{L}^{sy\mathfrak{m}}$ the class of all symmetric models for $L$ , and write
$\models_{\mathrm{M}_{L}^{sy\tau n}}\varphi$ to mean $\mathrm{t}_{!}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\varphi$ for all $\mathcal{M}\in \mathrm{M}_{L}^{sym}$ and for all $\omega\in \mathcal{M}$ .
$\overline{\mathfrak{o}}.2$ . We will show the agreement theorem on dominant actions:
Proposition 4. For a system of utility m.axim.izers $L$ we obtain that
$\models_{\mathrm{M}_{L}^{syr:}},\square _{E}(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{1}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{1})\wedge \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{2}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2}))arrow \mathrm{a}_{k}^{1}=\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2}$.
That is: If all players believe that each takes his dominant action then
they cannot agree to disagree.
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Proof. Let $\mathcal{M}\in \mathrm{M}^{sym}$ . Set $d_{:}$ : $2^{\Omega}arrow 2^{A}$ by
$d_{i}(E)=\{v_{\mathcal{M}}^{i}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i})\in A|E\subseteq||\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{i}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{i})||^{\mathcal{M}}\}$ .
We can plainly verify the three properties:
(1) $d_{i}(E)\subseteq d_{:}(F)$ if $E\supseteq F$.
(2) $|d_{\dot{l}}(E)|\leq 1$ if $E\neq\emptyset$ ,
(3) $d_{1}(E)=d_{2}(E)$ ,
(by definition of $d_{i}$ )
(because $V_{i}(\cdot,$ $\cdot;\omega)$ is injective.)
(because $\mathcal{M}$ is symmetric.)
Suppose $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\square _{E}(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{1}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{1})\wedge \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{2}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2}))$. Then we obtain
$\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\square _{i}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{i}(\mathrm{a}_{m}^{i})$ for $m=k,$ $l$ .











(i) In view of Example 2it can be observed that amodel $\mathcal{M}$ is not a
model of knowledge but amodel of belief because it does not satisfy the
axiom:
T $B_{:}(F)\subseteq F$.
(ii) There is no role of common-belief in Proposition 4.
(iii) It is not true that
$\models_{\mathrm{M}_{L}^{*ym}}\square _{1}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{1}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{1})\wedge\square _{2}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{2}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2})arrow \mathrm{a}_{k}^{1}=\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2}$ .
In fact, we can plainly observe that Example 2gives its counter example.
6. LOGIC OF AGREEMENT OF DOMINANT ACTIONS
6.1. By this we mean the least extension of $L^{u\tau n}.$ , denoted by $L^{ada}$ , that
contains the axiom
(ADA) $\square _{E}(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{1}(\mathrm{a}_{k}^{1})\wedge \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{2}(\mathrm{a}_{l}^{2}))arrow \mathrm{a}_{k}^{1}=\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{t}}^{2}$ .
It immediately follows from Proposition 4that




6.2. Completeness for $L^{ada}$ . By the similar argument in Section (4.9)
we can prove that:
Theorem 5. The systern $L^{ada}$ is com.plete with respect to $\mathrm{M}_{L^{ada}}^{sym}$ : $i.e.$ ,
$\vdash_{L^{ada}}\varphi$ $\Leftarrow$
$\models_{\mathrm{M}_{L^{ada}}^{*ym}}\varphi$ .
6.3. Finite model property. We can also prove that:
Theorem 6. The system $L^{ada}$ has finite model $property_{f}\cdot i.e.f$
$\vdash_{L^{ada}}\varphi$ $\Leftrightarrow$
$\models_{\mathrm{M}_{L^{ada}FIN}^{sym}}\varphi$ .
We will give the detail proofs in the future paper (Matsuhisa and Hirase
[7]) with further discussions.
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